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COMMENT
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IN A CRIMINAL CASE:
CAN IT BE WAIVED?
Statutes of limitation for crimes insulate defendants from prose-
cution after the passage of an express period of time following com-
mission of an offense.' Such statutes are designed to prevent preju-
dice by precluding prosecutors from bringing stale charges when the
defense would be handicapped by the inevitable loss of evidence.2
Congress has enacted statutes of limitation for all noncapital federal
crimes.' In so doing, it has determined that there is a point after
which society's interest in the administration of justice is subordi-
nate to a defendant's right to a fair trial.'
Many courts have reasoned that the Government's failure to pro-
secute before expiration of a statutory time limit is a jurisdictional
bar to prosecuting a defendant.' This rationale has justified allowing
1. Unites States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 322-23 (1971); Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S.
112, 114-15 (1970); United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 122 (1966); Benes v. United States,
276 F.2d 99, 108-09 (6th Cir. 1960).
2. See United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 322-23 (1971); Toussie v. United States, 397
U.S. 112, 114-15 (1970); United States v. Handel, 464 F.2d 679, 681 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 984 (1972).
Statutes of limitation are the "primary guarantee against bringing overly stale criminal
charges," United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 122 (1966), and are the primary form of
protection against prejudice resulting from preindictment delay. United States v. Dallago,
311 F. Supp. 227, 235 (E.D.N.Y. 1970).
If preaccusation delay impairs a defendant's ability to defend himself, he may have a due
process claim which will preclude his prosecution. McLawhorn v. North Carolina, 484 F. 2d
1, 3 n.7 (4th Cir. 1973); Ross v. United States, 349 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
3. For those noncapital crimes for which there is no specific statute of limitations, the
following applies: "Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, no person shall be prose-
cuted, tried, or punished for any offense, not capital, unless the indictment is found or the
information is instituted within five years next after such offense shall have been committed."
18 U.S.C. § 3282 (1970).
4. "Such statutes represent legislative assessments of relative interests of the State and
the defendant in administering and receiving justice . . . . These statutes provide predict-
ability by specifying a limit beyond which there is an irrebuttable presumption that a defen-
dant's right to a fair trial would be prejudiced." United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. at 322
(footnotes & citations omitted).
5. Waters v. United States, 328 F.2d 739 (10th Cir. 1964); Chaifetz v. United States, 288
F.2d 133 (D.C. Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 209 (1961); Benes v. United States, 276 F.2d
99 (6th Cir. 1960); State v. Steensland, 33 Idaho 529, 195 P. 1080 (1921). See United States
v. Harris, 133 F. Supp. 796 (W.D. Mo. 1955), aff'd on other grounds, 237 F.2d 274 (8th Cir.
1956); Savage v. Hawkins, 239 Ark. 658, 391 S.W.2d 18 (1965); People v. McGee, 1 Cal. 2d
611, 36 P.2d 378 (1934); Herman v. People, 124 Colo. 46, 233 P.2d 873 (1951); State v. King,
282 So.2d 162 (Fla. 1973); Ex Rel. B.H., 112 N.J. Super. 1, 270 A.2d 72 (Juv. & Dom. Rel.
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a defendant to raise a statute of limitations defense at any stage of
a proceeding or on appeal, despite his failure to assert it at trial. A
statute of limitations also may be the basis for a collateral attack,7
in that a verdict rendered without jurisdiction in the court is void.'
In a case of first impression, United States v. Wild,I the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia declined to adopt this jurisdic-
tional approach. 0 Wild, a former vice-president of Gulf Oil Corpora-
tion, was charged with consenting to illegal campaign contributions
in violation of title 18, section 610 of the United States Code." In
1973, as a result of negotiations between Gulf's counsel and the
Watergate Special Prosecution Force (WSPF), Wild pleaded guilty
Ct. 1970); City of Cleveland v. Hirsch, 26 Ohio App.2d 6, 268 N.E.2d 600 (1971).
6. Waters v. United States, 328 F.2d 739, 743 (10th Cir. 1964) (statute of limitations is
jurisdictional and may be noted on appeal); Askins v. United States, 251 F.2d 909, 911 (D.C.
Cir. 1958) (defendant initially may raise statute of limitations on motion to set aside his
conviction under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970) (habeas corpus)); City of Cleveland v. Hirsch, 26
Ohio App.2d 6,._. , 268 N.E.2d 600, 601 (1971) (criminal statutes of limitation may be raised
before or after conviction).
7. In United States v. Harris, 133 F. Supp. 796 (W.D. Mo. 1955), aff'd on other grounds,
237 F.2d 274 (8th Cir. 1956), the defendant pleaded guilty at trial and did not raise the
statute. He nevertheless was permitted to assert the defense on a habeas corpus motion
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970) because a guilty plea does not waive jurisdictional
defects.
28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970) permits questioning the validity of a sentence at any time. The
statute provides in pertinent part:
A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress
claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed
in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court
was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in
excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral
attack, may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or
correct the sentence.
A motion for such relief may be made at any time.
Id. (emphasis supplied).
8. See United States v. Harris, 133 F. Supp. 796, 799-800 (W.D. Mo. 1955), aff'd on other
grounds, 237 F.2d 274 (8th Cir. 1956); Herman v. People, 124 Colo. 46, 50-51, 233 P.2d 873,
876 (1951); City of Cleveland v. Hirsch, 26 Ohio App.2d 6, - , 268 N.E.2d 600, 602 (1971).
9. 551 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 45 U.S.L.W. 3747 (U.S. May 16, 1977).
10. The court began the opinion by noting: "This is a case of first impression." Id. at 419.
11. The law provided in pertinent part:
[E]very officer or director of any corporation, or officer of any labor organiza-
tion, who consents to any contribution or expenditure by the corporation or
labor organization, as the case may be, and any person who accepts or receives
any contribution in violation of this section, shall be fined not more than $1,000
or imprisoned not more than one year, or both; and if the violation was willful,
shall be fined not more than $50,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or
both.
Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, § 610, 62 Stat. 723 (current version at 2 U.S.C.A. § 441(b) (Supp.
III 1976)).
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to a misdemeanor violation of section 610. In 1975, the WSPF re-
sumed its investigation of Gulf and notified Wild that it was pre-
pared to seek his indictment for three violations of section 610; the
statute of limitations"2 on one of the violations was to expire the day
after the return date of the proposed indictment.
The WSPF indicated to Wild that his cooperation in supplying
information that would lead to prosecutions of the ultimate recipi-
ents of the contributions might result in the termination of further
proceedings against him. Anxious to avoid indictment, and after
consultation with counsel, Wild signed an express waiver of the
statute of limitations."3 Wild thereafter supplied the WSPF with
information and testified before a grand jury concerning the recipi-
ents of the illegal political contributions. Despite such cooperation,
the WSPF sought and obtained an indictment against Wild, one
count of which included the violation on which the statute of limita-
tions had expired. Wild challenged this count of the indictment in
the district court 4 on the grounds that it was barred by the statute
of limitations and that the statute could not be waived. After deter-
mining that the expiration of the statute did not constitute a juris-
dictional bar to prosecution, 5 the court of appeals reversed the lower
court" and held that the statute was waivable. 7
12. The statute provided in pertinent part:
"No person shall be prosecuted, tried, or punished for any violation of... section ... 610
• . .of title 18 ... unless the indictment is found or the information is instituted within 3
years after the date of the violation." Act of Oct. 15, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, tit. III, § 302,
88 Stat. 1289 (current version at 2 U.S.C.A. § 455(a) (Cum. Supp. 1976)).
13. Wild signed the following statement:
I have been advised by your office [WSPF] that a federal grand jury is
presently investigating my alleged involvement in the making of unlawful corpo-
rate campaign contributions by Gulf Oil Corporation and particularly my al-
leged involvement with respect to corporate contributions made in connection
with the 1972 election campaign of Sam Nunn, a candidate for United States
Senator from Georgia.
In consideration of your office's delaying any final decision with respect to
charging me with any criminal violations in connection with the alleged contri-
bution to Sam Nunn's campaign, a delay requested by me for my benefit, I
hereby waive all defenses grounded upon the applicable statute of limitations
with respect to the Nunn transaction. I have discussed this matter with my
attorney, Edward Bennett Williams, Esq., and I fully understand the conse-
quences of this waiver.
551 F.2d at 420 n.3.
14. United States v. Wild, No. 76-110 (D.D.C. June 24, 1976).
15. 551 F.2d at 423.
16. Id. at 425.
17. Id. at 423. "We decide that where, as here, the defendant followed the advice of
competent counsel and executed an express written waiver prior to the expiration of the
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Wild raises two questions: First, is a statute of limitations a bar
to prosecuting a defendant or is it an affirmative defense; and sec-
ond, is such a statute waivable?'" Most courts have treated the
waivability issue as dependent on whether the statute is treated as
jurisdictional or as an affirmative defense.'" If the court adopts the
jurisdictional approach, the statute cannot be waived: the running
of the statute extinguishes the court's power to try the case,"0 and
no action or agreement of the parties can supply the requisite juris-
diction.2' In jurisdictions in which the statute of limitations is
deemed to be an affirmative defense, however, most courts treat the
statute as waivable 2 This Comment will appraise the validity of
this distinction and attempt to determine whether the statute of
limitations should be a waivable defense.
STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS: AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE OR BAR TO
PROSECUTION?
The Affirmative Defense Approach
Primary authority for Wild is an 1872 Supreme Court decision,
statute of limitations, the district court was not without jurisdiction to try him upon his
subsequent indictment." Id. at 419.
18. "The first step in our analysis ... is to determine whether the statute constitutes a
jurisdictional bar to prosecution or whether it is equivalent to an affirmative defense." Id. at
421. "Our next task then, having decided that the statute does not constitute a jurisdictional
bar, is to determine whether Wild could validly waive his potential defense ... by a written
agreement ... prior to its expiration." Id. at 423.
19. See generally 8 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 12.03 [1] (2d ed. 1976); 1 WHARTON'S
CRIMINAL LAW & PROCEDURE §§ 179, 185 (1957); 1 WRIGHT's FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE
§ 193, at 410-11 (1969).
20. See State v. Fogel, 16 Ariz. App. 246, -_, 492 P.2d 742, 744 (1972); People v. Rehman,
62 Cal. 2d 135, -, 396 P.2d 913, 915, 41 Cal. Rptr. 457, 459 (1965); Moore v. State, 43 N.J.L.
203, 209 (1881); People v. Warden, 242 App. Div. 282, 284, 275 N.Y.S. 59, 62 (1934). See
generally notes 5, 6, 8 supra.
21. See Mitchell v. Maurer, 293 U.S. 237, 244 (1934); United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d
1124, 1140 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Kerner v. United States, 417 U.S. 976 (1974);
McCusker v. Cupp, 506 F.2d 459, 459-60 (9th Cir. 1974); Pon v. United States, 168 F.2d 373,
374 (1st Cir. 1948); Colson v. Smith, 315 F. Supp. 179, 182 (N.D. Ga. 1970), aff'd on other
grounds, 438 F.2d 1075 (5th Cir. 1971).
22. In the following cases the statute of limitations was said to be a defense which must
be asserted at or before trial: Biddinger v. Commissioner of Police, 245 U.S. 128, 135 (1917);
United States v. Kenner, 354 F.2d 780, 785 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 958 (1966);
United States v. Taylor, 207 F.2d 437, 438 (2d Cir. 1953); United States v. Franklin, 188 F.2d
182, 186 (7th Cir. 1951); Forthoffer v. Swope, 103 F.2d 707, 709 (9th Cir. 1939); Pruett v.
United States, 3 F.2d 353, 354 (9th Cir. 1925). In People v. Brady, 257 App. Div. 1000, 13
N.Y.S. 789 (1939), the court expressly stated that by failing to assert the statute, the defen-
dant waived its benefit.
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United States v. Cook,23 in which the Court held that the statute of
limitations could not be pleaded by demurrer" because such a plea
would deprive the prosecution of the opportunity to prove that the
case fell within an exception to the statute." The failure of the
indictment to show on its face that it was returned within the statu-
tory period should not bar the prosecution from proving, for exam-
ple, that the defendant was a fugitive, and thus within an exception
to the statute. Even absent such an exception, the Court held, the
prosecution should be allowed to challenge the sufficiency of the
defense, inasmuch as "time is not of the essence of the offense."' ,
The correct method of asserting the statute of limitations, therefore,
was by special plea or by evidence under the general issue.27
Related to the question of the requisite form of the pleadings is
that of their necessary components. Cook explained which elements
of a crime the prosecution must allege for a sound indictment. If the
statute defining the offense contains an exception in its enacting
clause and the exception is so incorporated into the definition of the
crime that "the offense cannot be accurately and clearly described
if [it] is omitted," then the indictment must show that the defen-
dant is not within the exception.2 1 If the exception is "entirely sepa-
rable" from the definition of the crime, however, then it is not a part
of the offense which must be pleaded and proved by the prosecution
but is, rather, a matter of defense. 29
The holding in Cook resulted from the requirements of the com-
mon law forms of pleading. Despite the admittedly archaic language
used by the Court in Cook,30 the court in Wild nonetheless con-
cluded that in Cook the statute was considered to be a defense
which must be raised by the defendant." Although the court of
appeals noted that the defendant was required to raise the defense
by a special plea or by evidence under the general issue so that the
23. 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 168 (1872).
24. Id. at 179.
25. Id. at 179-80.
26. Id. at 180.
27. Id. at 179-80.
28. Id. at 173-74.
29. Id.
30. See United States v. Wild, 551 F.2d at 421.
31. "Although the parties [in Cook] did not raise the issue, and the Court made no
mention of the effect of the statute's expiration on a court's subject matter jurisdiction, it
is clear that the Court considered the statute to be in the nature of a defense which must be
raised by the defendant." Id. at 422 (footnote omitted).
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prosecution might answer the pleading," it apparently ignored the
immateriality of this rationale under modern procedural rules.33
Similarly, the mode for determining whether an exception to a crim-
inal statute must be pleaded by the prosecutor or defendant does
not answer the question in Wild-whether the statute of limitations
is jurisdictional or a matter of defense. That the statute in the
nineteenth century could not be the subject of a demurrer to an
allegation of a particular statutory offense is not grounds for equat-
ing it with an affirmative defense under modern pleading practice.'
As further support for determining that the statute of limitations
is not jurisdictional, Wild relied on Askins v. United States.5 In
Askins, the defendant was tried for first degree murder, a capital
crime having no statute of limitations,36 but was convicted of second
degree murder, which had a limitation of three years.37 His convic-
tion was returned more than three years after the commission of the
offense and was affirmed on appeal.38 The defendant then filed a
motion to set aside his sentence on the grounds that the expiration
of the statute of limitations had deprived the court of jurisdiction
to impose sentence.39 Although Askins had not raised the issue at
trial or on appeal, he was allowed to attack his conviction collater-
ally because he had been indicted for first degree murder and conse-
quently had been unable to raise the statutory defense until the
verdict was rendered for the lesser offense."0 The court held: "A
sentence imposed for second degree murder upon an indictment
timely for first degree murder, but found more than three years after
the offense, is a sentence which is not authorized by law."" Without
32. Id. at 421-22.
33. "Pleadings in criminal proceedings shall be the indictment and the information, and
the pleas of not guilty, guilty, and nolo contendere. All other pleas, and demurrers and
motions to quash are abolished ...." FED. R. CraM. P. 12(a).
34. There are no absolute statements in Cook that the statute is jurisdictional or an affirm-
ative defense; rather, the Court resolved the issue by ruling so that both parties may submit
pleadings on the question. Nevertheless, the circuit court in Wild analogized between the
special plea and the contemporary affirmative defense. 551 F.2d at 421.
35. 251 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1958). See 551 F.2d at 422.
36. "An indictment for any offense punishable by death may be found at any time without
limitation ...... 18 U.S.C. § 3281 (1970).
37. The applicable statute of limitations, is now five years. See note 3 supra.
38. Askins v. United States, 231 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 989 (1956).
39. 251 F.2d at 910. Askins also claimed a violation of his constitutional right to a speedy
trial. Id. The court did not meet the constitutional issue because the statute was determina-
tive.
40. Id. at 912.
41. Id.
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more, Askins would support the proposition that the statute of limi-
tations is jurisdictional; the court, however, qualified its decision.
In its qualified holding, the court in Askins distinguished the situa-
tion in which a statute of limitations is applicable to the offense
charged in an indictment: "In that event the defense of the statute
must be raised at the trial or before trial on motion. If this is not
done and a verdict of guilty is rendered, sentence may be lawfully
imposed."4 The court in Wild considered this statement to be con-
sistent with its interpretation of Cook, that the statute of limita-
tions is equivalent to an affirmative defense. 3 Neither Cook nor
Askins, however, mandate a decision unfavorable to the defendant
in Wild. On the contrary, Cook is of questionable value in determin-
ing modern procedural questions, and the actual holding in Askins
does not support Wild.
The other cases cited in Wild as supportive of the affirmative
defense rationale are Biddinger v. Commissioner of Police" and
United States v. Kenner.5 Biddinger" and Kenner47 merely assert
that the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense that must
be raised by a defendant at trial. In neither case, however, is the
jurisdictional question considered; no rationale is provided beyond
citations to Cook and Askins.1" Other decisions not cited in Wild
have treated the statute as waived if not asserted in the trial court,
making the defense unavailable in a collateral attack situation" or
on appeal." These refusals to consider the statute of limitations
issue unless it is raised at trial are, by implication, determinations
that the defense is nonjurisdictional. Although they treat the stat-
ute of limitations as though it were an affirmative defense, these
42. Id. at 913 (footnotes omitted).
43. 551 F.2d at 422.
44. 245 U.S. 128 (1917). See 551 F.2d at 422 n.7.
45. 354 F.2d 780 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 958 (1966). See 551 F.2d at 422 n.7.
46. 245 U.S. at 135.
47. 354 F.2d at 785.
48. Biddinger was an extradition proceeding to which the statute of limitations issue was
only peripheral. In Kenner, the defendant first raised the defense of the statute in a collateral
attack on his sentence. Citing Askins's dicta, the court stated the defendant could not attack
his sentence after having failed to raise the issue at trial. 354 F.2d at 785. De facto, the
defendant's failure to assert the statute before or during trial constituted a waiver.
49. Forthoffer v. Swope, 103 F.2d 707 (9th Cir. 1939). But see United States v. Mathues,
27 F.2d 137 (E.D. Pa. 1928).
50. United States v. Taylor, 207 F.2d 437 (2d Cir. 1953); United States v. Franklin, 188
F.2d 182 (7th Cir. 1951); Pruett v. United States, 3 F.2d 353 (9th Cir. 1925). In both Pruett
and Taylor, it was not actually established that the statute had run; this may have affected
the result.
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cases do not conclusively establish that the statute is in fact an
affirmative defense, waivable by the defendant.
The Jurisdictional Approach
Many decisions have treated the running of the statute as an
expurgation of the crime which deprives the court of jurisdiction to
prosecute the defendant." Other courts have reasoned that, because
the state has determined that it will limit its right to prosecute
criminals after an established period of time, the burden of proof is
on the Government to show that the offense was committed within
the statutory period.2 Under either rationale, the satisfaction of the
statute of limitations has been treated as a prerequisite to the
court's jurisdiction.53
51. People v. McGee, 1 Cal. 2d 611, -, 36 P.2d 378, 379 (1934) ("[Tlhe statute is
jurisdictional, and ... an indictment or information which shows on its face that the prosecu-
tion is barred by limitations fails to state a public offense."); Herman v. People, 124 Colo.
46, 50, 233 P.2d 873, 876 (1951)
(Had a verdict of guilt been returned under this information, any judgment or
sentence thereon would have been void because of the running of the statute on
such a crime would have been to the effect that there was no crime, as such,
existing at the time of the trial. Therefore, the court was without jurisdiction to
proceed further than to dismiss the case .... );
In re Pillo, 11 N.J. 8, 18, 93 A.2d 176, 181 (1952) ("In practical effect the lapse of time works
an expurgation of the crime."); Moore v. State, 43 N.J.L. 203, 209 (1881) ("[W]hen the
specified period shall have arrived, the right of the state to prosecute shall be gone, and the
liability of the offender to be punished, - to be deprived of his liberty, - shall cease.").
52. Az Din v. United States, 232 F.2d 283, 287 (9th Cir. 1956) ("The Government has the
burden of proving that the [crime] was within [the statutory] period."); United States v.
Schneiderman, 106 F. Supp. 892, 897 (S.D. Cal. 1952) ("[T]o convict the accused, the proof
must establish that the [offense] was committed, within the . . . period of the statute of
limitations"); Lowe v. State, 154 Fla. 780, -, 19 So.2d 106, 107-08 (1944) ("The law places
the burden of proof on the prosecution, upon the trial of a criminal case, to show that the
commission of the offense as charged was committed within the two year period prescribed
by statute.").
The dissent in United States v. Waldin, 253 F.2d 551 (3d Cir. 1958) stated: "The burden
of proving affirmatively that the crime was committed within a period not proscribed by the
applicable statute of limitations is on the United States." Id. at 559 (dissenting opinion).
53. "The time within which an offense is committed is a jurisdictional fact in all cases
subject to limitation." Mitchell v. State, 157 Fla. 121, -, 25 So.2d 73, 74 (1946). See State
v. Steensland, 33 Idaho 529, -, 195 P. 1080, 1081 (1921); City of Cleveland v. Hirsch, 26
Ohio App.2d 6, -, 268 N.E.2d 600, 602 (1971). Legislatures have limited the time within
which to prosecute criminals and taken from the courts the power to proceed once a statute
has run. People v. McGee, 1 Cal. 2d 611, -_, 36 P.2d 378-79 (1934). The protection provided
by a statute of limitations is in the nature of a substantive right. United States v. Haramic,
125 F. Supp. 128, 129 (W.D. Pa. 1954). Some decisions adopt the jurisdictional approach by
implication. Chaifetz v. United States, 288 F.2d 133 (D.C. Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S.
209 (1961); Benes v. United States, 276 F.2d 99 (6th Cir. 1960).
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The language of the statute of limitations at issue has been piv-
otal to the conclusion of many courts that the statute bars prosecu-
tion of the defendant." In United States v. Harris, " for example, the
language of the statute, characterized by terms of "extinguishment
or prohibition of prosecution" rather than of "repose," was determi-
native. 6 Although the defendant had pleaded guilty to an informa-
tion, 7 the court held that the defendant was entitled to challenge
the lawfulness of his sentence because the expiration of the statute
operated as a jurisdictional bar to his prosecution.58 In so holding,
the court noted that, because the language used in the statute de-
prived the court of jurisdiction over an offense barred by the statute,
no punishable federal offense had been committed." When con-
fronted with similar statutes of limitation, courts have asserted that
they must effectuate "the clear expression of Congressional will that
in such a case 'no person shall be prosecuted, tried, or punished.' 60
Adhering to the general rule of statutory construction that if the
language of a statute is unambiguous its plain meaning will pre-
vail,6 ' courts have been reluctant to make exceptions to unequivocal
language and thus have treated the statutes of limitation as juris-
dictional.2 Generally, precedent reflecting this approach deals with
a statute" containing an express exception.6 The statute in Wild
54. Waters v. United States, 328 F.2d 739, 743 (10th Cir. 1964); United States v. Harris,
133 F. Supp. 796, 799 (W.D. Mo. 1955), aff'd on other grounds, 237 F.2d 274 (8th Cir. 1956);
United States v. Zisblatt Furniture Co., 78 F. Supp. 9, 11-13 (S.D.N.Y. 1948), appeal
dismissed, 336 U.S. 934 (1949); Savage v. Hawkins, 239 Ark. 658, -, 391 S.W.2d 18, 20
(1965); State v. King, 282 So.2d 162, 167 (Fla. 1973).
55. 133 F. Supp. 796 (W.D, Mo. 1955), aff'd on other grounds, 237 F.2d 274 (8th Cir. 1956).
56. Id. at 799.
57. A plea of guilty is a waiver of all non-jurisdictional defects. Salazar v. Rodriguez, 371
F.2d 726 (10th Cir. 1967); United States v. Reincke, 341 F.2d 977 (2d Cir. 1965); United States
v. Gallagher, 183 F.2d 342 (3d Cir. 1950); Berg v. United States, 176 F.2d 122 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 338 U.S. 876 (1949).
58. 133 F. Supp. 796, 799-800 (W.D. Mo. 1955).
59. Id. at 799.
60. Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 124 (1970) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (1970)).
61. See Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 115 (1970); United States v. Richardson,
393 F. Supp. 83, 87 (W.D. Pa. 1974), aff'd, 512 F.2d 105 (3d Cir. 1975); United States v. Udell,
109 F. Supp. 96, 98 (D. Del. 1952); United States v. Ganaposki, 72 F. Supp. 982, 985 (M.D.
Pa. 1947); United States v. Nazzaro, 65 F. Supp. 456, 457 (S.D.N.Y. 1946); State v. King,
282 So.2d 162, 167 (Fla. 1973). This principle has been applied in civil cases. See, e.g., Corona
Coal Co. v. United States, 263 U.S. 537 (1924).
62. See, e.g., Waters v. United States, 328 F.2d 739 (10th Cir. 1964); United States v.
Harris, 133 F. Supp. 796 (W.D. Mo. 1955); Savage v. Hawkins 239 Ark. 658, 391 S.W.2d 18
(1965); State v. King, 282 So.2d 162 (Fla. 1973)..
63. 18 U.S.C. § 3282. See notes 3 & 54 supra; note 68 infra.
64. See note 3 supra (the statute is applicable except as otherwise provided by law).
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contained no such exception; rather, it is couched in absolute terms
providing that "[n]o person shall be prosecuted, tried, or punished
. ..unless the indictment is found or the information is instituted
within 3 years after the date of the violation."65 Therefore, the
plain meaning rule of statutory construction might be applied even
more logically to Wild.
In view of Congressional policy that statutes of limitations are not
to be extended "except as otherwise expressly provided by law,""6
courts have determined that statutes of limitation are not to be
extended unless Congress specifically provides. 7 Exercising judicial
restraint, courts thus have applied the maxim that lawmaking is the
function of the legislature, not the judiciary; any exceptions to and
extensions of statutes of limitation are therefore a legislative respon-
sibility. 8 Moreover, judicial policy views statutes of limitation as
statutes of repose that should be interpreted liberally in favor of
defendants. 9 If there are ambiguous or conflicting provisions, courts
look to legislative intent but generally resolve any doubts in favor
of defendants. 0 Congressional policy for over 150 years has been
that prosecution for noncapital crimes should be limited and that
exceptions to this policy "ought to be manifested in a clear and
unequivocal manner."7'
65. 2 U.S.C. § 455(a) (Supp. 1976) (amended 1976).
66. 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (1970).
67. United States v. Richardson, 393 F. Supp. 83, 87 (W.D. Pa. 1974), aff'd, 512 F.2d 105
(3d Cir. 1975). Confronted with the issue of retroactive application of the statute of limita-
tions, the court said, "[in the absence of a clear statement from Congress that it intended
retroactive application of the extended statute we do not think we should extend it by judicial
order. To do so would presume that Congress was in error-that it passed a statute which
did not reflect its intent. We think the better course is to presume that Congress was not
mistaken ... ").
68. Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 121 (1970); United States v. Richardson, 393
F. Supp. 83-87 (W.D. Pa. 1974), aff'd, 512 F.2d 105 (3d Cir. 1975); United States v. Udell,
109 F. Supp. 96, 98 (D. Del. 1952); United States v. Ganaposki, 72 F. Supp. 982, 983 (M.D.
Pa. 1947); United States v. Nazzaro, 65 F. Supp. 456, 457 (S.D.N.Y. 1946); State v. King,
282 So.2d 162, 167 (Fla. 1973).
69. The Supreme Court frequently has articulated this policy. United States v. Habig, 390
U.S. 222, 227 (1968); Bridges v. United States, 346 U.S. 209, 215-16 (1953); United States v.
Scharton, 285 U.S. 518, 522 (1932). See United States v. McElvain, 272 U.S. 633, 639 (1926).
70. See United States v. Mendoza, 122 F. Supp. 367, 368 (N.D. Cal. 1954); United States
v. Zisblatt Furniture Co., 78 F. Supp. 9, 12-13 (S.D.N.Y. 1948), appeal dismissed, 336 U.S.
934 (1949). See also note 61 supra; Reevis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971); Bell v.
United States, 349 U.S. 81, 83 (1955).
71. For over 150 years it has been the public policy of the United States, as
revealed by the enactments of Congress, to limit the time within which to
institute criminal proceedings in noncapital cases .... This court will not lightly
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Wild, however, did not heed this policy. Although Congress has
not provided that a criminal defendant may waive the protection of
the statute of limitations, the court in Wild was unconcerned with
the policies motivating the legislature's silence. On the contrary,
instead of resolving any doubts in favor of the accused, the court in
Wild resolved the issue in favor of the prosecution, thus creating an
exception to the statute not provided by Congress. This departure
from the general rules of statutory construction and the longstand-
ing policy of judicial restraint may thwart the purpose for which
such statutes were enacted.
When confronted with issues similar to those presented in Wild,
other courts, however, have resolved the issue in favor of the juris-
dictional approach and unequivocally have refused to allow prose-
cution of the defendant after the statute has run. In Benes v. United
States,7" for example, the defendant was charged with tax fraud
prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations. He initiated a
civil action to enjoin the United States attorney from presenting
certain evidence to the grand jury; the prosecution agreed not to
pursue the criminal charge before resolution of the civil litigation.
After resolving the civil issue, an indictment was returned against
the defendant. The statute, however, had run as to one of the
counts, and Benes contended that the prosecution thus was barred
by limitations. Treating the statute of limitations as jurisdictional,
the court of appeals held that the indictment was barred by the
running of the statute, which was not waived by the voluntary with-
holding of prosecution.7 3 Although Benes clearly is more analogous
to Wild than the decisions on which the court relied,74 the court in
Wild failed to follow this decision.
assume that Congress intended to place this defendant in the category of a
defendant in a capital case with respect to the statute of limitations by apply-
ing a general rule of construction. Such an intention ought to be manifested in
a clear and unequivocal manner, especially where the door is open for reason-
able minds to differ upon the construction of the statute.
United States v. Zisblatt Furniture Co., 78 F. Supp. 9, 12 (S.D.N.Y. 1948), appeal dis-
missed, 336 U.S. 934 (1949).
72. 276 F.2d 99 (6th Cir. 1960).
73. And the general rule is further that an indictment, found after the expira-
tion of the time for beginning prosecution, is barred by the statute of limitations
and is not waived by the fact that the prosecution was withheld on account of
an agreement with the accused, or by the fact that the accused procured contin-
uances of the preliminary hearing from time to time until the period of limita-
tions had expired.
Id. at 109 (citations omitted).
74. United States v. Cook, 84 U.S. 168 (1872); United States v. Doyle, 348 F.2d 715 (2d
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In Chaifetz v. United States,75 the defendant asked that an in-
struction on a lesser included offense be given to the jury. The court
refused the instruction, reasoning that because the lesser offense
was barred by a statute of limitations it could not support a convic-
tion.7" This denial effectively prevented Chaifetz from waiving the
bar of the statute even though such a waiver would benefit him. In
so deciding, the court noted that "a statute of limitations in a crimi-
nal case ... is not merely a statute of repose but creates a bar to
the prosecution."7 Although such language indicates that the court
deemed the statute to be jurisdictional, Wild rejected this conten-
tion; the court stated that when viewed "in light of Cook, it is
apparent that such is not the case",78 in that under Cook the statute
acts as a bar only if the prosecution is unable to demonstrate an
exception. Yet the language and the holding of Chaifetz indicate
that the court treated the expiration of the statute as a jurisdic-
tional bar to prosecution rather than as an affirmative defense.
Chaifetz was decided by the same court as Wild, yet Wild implicitly
contravenes the posture assumed by that court seventeen years ear-
lier. Not only is the interpretation of Chaifetz in Wild unsubstan-
tiated, but also the holding in Wild directly contradicts those of
other circuit courts considering the waivability of statutes of limita-
tion.79
Although the majority of courts have adopted the jurisdictional
approach, the court in Wild rejected such an approach, relying in-
stead on cases such as Cook that did not discuss waiver of the
statute of limitations and ignoring analogous cases such as Benes
that expressly considered the waiver question. Even so, despite the
court's apparently fallacious reasoning, the holding appears correct.
Both the jurisdictional and the affirmative defense approaches
are too arbitrary. Because adopting either one automatically dis-
Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 843 (1965); Askins v. United States, 251 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1958);
United States v. Parrino, 212 F.2d 919 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 840 (1954).
75. 288 F.2d 133 (D.C. Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 209 (1961).
76. "Since Chaifetz could not, at the time of his trial, have been convicted of the misde-
meanor of failing to file required information for the year 1953, he was not entitled to have
the trial judge tell the jury it could, or should, find him guilty of that offense." Id.. at 136.
77. Id. at 135-36 (citing Benes).
78. 551 F.2d at 422. The court conceded there was other case law contrary to its position
but insisted that Cook justified its opinion. Id. at 422-23 n. 9, citing Waters v. United States,
328 F.2d 739 (10th Cir. 1964).
79. Waters v. United States, 328 F.2d 739, 743 (10th Cir. 1964); Benes v. United States,
276 F.2d 99, 109 (6th Cir. 1960). See Askins v. United States, 251 F.2d 909, 911-12 (D.C. Cir.
1958).
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poses of the waivability issue, the court is unable to use its discre-
tion in determining whether the defense was waived or should have
been waived in any particular situation. The unique circumstances
of a given case may make it unreasonable for a court adopting the
affirmative defense approach to presume the efficacy of a waiver.8"
Similarly, the jurisdictional approach is arbitrary in that it fails to
provide for instances in which permitting a waiver would not frus-
trate public policy. A case by case analysis focusing on waivability
of the particular statute, rather than on the unclear jurisdictional-
affirmative defense distinction, is the preferable approach.8'
WAIVER OF CRIMINAL STATUTES OF LIMITATION
Waiver of Constitutional Rights and Civil Statutes of Limitation
Consideration of the waivability of constitutional guarantees and
civil statutes of limitation provides a framework within which to
analyze the desirability of permitting criminal statutes of limitation
to be waived. A criminal defendant may waive constitutional pro-
tections82 by failing to assert them, by a plea of guilty, or by an
express waiver similar to that in Wild. The accused may waive
rights such as the right to counsel,83 protection from double jeop-
ardy,84 the right to be tried in the district in which the offense was
committed, 5 the right against self-incrimination, 8 the right to trial
80. Although most potential defects in a waiver agreement should be uncovered by counsel,
ambiguities as to material terms still may exist. If a prosecutor accepts a waiver in bad faith,
it should be ineffective.
81. Although such an approach would not decrease the amount of litigation on the subject,
it would clarify the issues if courts focused on the language of the statute instead of looking
to precedent involving similar but not identical statutes. The best solution would be the
enactment of clarifying legislation.
82. See notes 83-88 infra.
83. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). A defendant "may waive his constitutional
right to assistance of counsel if he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with his
eyes open." Adams v. United States, 317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942) (citing Johnson).
84. "The constitutional immunity from double jeopardy is a personal right which, if not
affirmatively pleaded by the defendant at the time of trial, will be regarded as waived."
United States v. Scott, 464 F.2d 832, 833 (D.C. Cir. 1972). The protection is waived by a plea
of guilty. United States v. Hoyland, 264 F.2d 346, 351 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 845
(1959).
85. "The right of an accused to be tried in a particular venue is a personal privilege which
may be waived." Bickford v. Looney, 219 F.2d 555, 556 (10th Cir. 1955) (footnote omitted).
A request for a change of venue is a waiver of the accused's right to trial in the jurisdiction
where the offense originally occurred. Jones v. Gasch, 404 F.2d 1231, 1235 (D.C. Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1029 (1968).
86. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
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by jury, 7 and the right to confront one's accusers."8 Nonetheless,
judicial policy is to "indulge every reasonable presumption against
waiver of fundamental constitutional rights"." Hence, to be valid,
a waiver must be an "intentional relinquishment or abandonment
of a known right or privilege,"90 and waivers of constitutional rights
are scrutinized very closely.' In civil suits, the statute of limitations
defense is considered a personal privilege that may be waived by
conduct or agreement. 2 Generally, the defense is deemed waived if
not asserted at the time of trial. 3 The minority view, however, is
that civil statutes may not be waived because such action would
defeat their underlying rationale.94 In view of the ability to waive
constitutional rights, the court in Wild discerned no reason to pro-
scribe criminal defendants from waiving statutory rights as well.9 5
The court did note, however, that civil statutes of limitation affect
less critical interests than criminal statutes; such a distinction
might justify permitting the former to be waived while prohibiting
waiver of the latter. It therefore becomes necessary to determine
whether compelling policy reasons exist for treating criminal stat-
utes of limitation as nonwaivable.
87. Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 312 (1930). A defendant may waive his right to
trial by a jury of twelve and consent to a jury of fewer than twelve, or to no jury. Id.
88. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969).
89. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (footnote omitted), quoting Aetna Ins. Co.
v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937). The corollary to this is that the Supreme Court does
not "presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights." Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public
Util. Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292, 307 (1937).
90. "A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right
or privilege." Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). See Green v. United States, 355
U.S. 184 (1957); Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155 (1957).
91. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969) (will not presume waiver of right against
self-incrimination, right to trial by jury, and right to confront one's accusers from a silent
record; court must ascertain that plea was intentionally, voluntarily, and knowingly made);
Schnecklath v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 241 (1973) (strict standard of waiver applied to
those rights guaranteed to criminal defendant to insure that he is accorded greatest possible
opportunity to utilize every facet of constitutional model of fair criminal trial).
92. Allen v. Smith, 129 U.S. 465, 470 (1889); Nightingale v. Sanger, 122 U.S. 176, 183
(1887); Parchen v. Chessman, 49 Mont. 326, _ ,142 P. 631, 633 (1914); State v. Hart Motor
Express, Inc., 270 Minn. 24, __, 132 N.W.2d 391, 394 (1964).
93. Oedekerk v. Muncie Gear'Works, Inc., 179 F.2d 821, 824 (7th Cir. 1950); Van Sant v.
American Express Co., 169 F.2d 355, 372 (3d Cir. 1948).
94. Forbach v. Steinfeld, 34 Ariz. 519, __, 273 P. 6, 9 (1928) (if made in advance, agree-
ment to waive a statute of limitations is against public policy); First Nat'l Bank v. Mock, 70
Colo. 517, -, 203 P. 272, 274 (1921) (waiver of statute of limitations for indefinite period
of time is void).
95. "It seems to us, too, if a defendant may waive certain constitutional rights, he should
certainly be capable in this instance of waiving a statutory right such as the statute of
limitations." 551 F.2d at 424.
CRIMINAL STATUTES OF LIMITATION
The Policy Differences between Civil and Criminal Statutes of
Limitation
The purpose of both civil and criminal statutes of limitation is to
protect defendants from having to defend against an old claim or
charge at a time when they are incapable of presenting their defen-
ses adequately. 6 The underlying rationale of civil statutes " is to
encourage promptness in the bringing of actions [so] that the par-
ties should not suffer by loss of evidence from death or disappear-
ance of witnesses, destruction of documents or failure of memory." 7
In contrast to civil statutes of limitation which go to the remedy
only, criminal statutes of limitation restrict the power of the sover-
eign to act against the accused; they create a bar to the prosecution
of the defendant." The purposes of criminal statutes of limitation
are more comprehensive than those of civil statutes; not only the
interests of the accused but also those of society and of the criminal
justice system are the focus of legislative and judicial concern.9
Such statutes represent a "legislative assessment of the relative
interests of the state and the defendant in administering and receiv-
ing justice;-" they determine that after the lapse of a designated
period of time, society's interest in the prosecution of criminals is
secondary to the defendant's right to a fair trial. 01
Unlike their civil counterparts, criminal statutes of limitation
specify a time limit beyond which an irrebuttable presumption ar-
ises that the defendant's right to a fair trial would be prejudiced.0 2
They are the primary form of protection afforded a criminal defen-
dant against prejudice resulting from pre-indictment delay. Their
purpose is more comprehensive than that of civil statutes, inasmuch
96. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 322-23 (1971) (criminal statutes); Toussie v.
United States, 397 U.S. 112, 114-15 (1970) (criminal statutes); Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donald-
son, 325 U.S. 304, 314-15 (1945) (civil statutes); Missouri, Kan. & Tex. Ry. v. Harriman, 227
U.S. 657, 672 (1913) (civil statutes).
97. Missouri, Kan. & Tex. Ry. v. Harriman, 227 U.S. 657, 672 (1913).
98. Benes v. Unites States, 276 F.2d 99, 109 (6th Cir. 1960).
99. See United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 322-23 (1971); Toussie v. United States,
397 U.S. 112, 114-15 (1970); Benes v. United States, 276 F.2d 99, 108-09 (6th Cir. 1960);
United States v. Bonanno, 177 F. Supp. 106, 112 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), rev'd on other grounds
sub nor. United States v. Bufalino, 285 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1960).
100. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 322 (1970).
101. Id.; Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 114-15 (1970); Benes v. Unites States, 276
F.2d 99, 108-09, (6th Cir. 1960). See United States v. Bonanno, 177 F. Supp. 106, 112
(S.D.N.Y. 1959), rev'd on other grounds sub noa. United States v. Bufalino, 285 F.2d 408
(2d Cir. 1960); Askins v. United States, 251 F.2d 909, 912 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
102. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 322 (1971).
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as criminal statutes of limitation are designed not only to bar prose-
cutions based on stale evidence but also to end prosecutions for
crimes a reasonable time after the commission of the offense "when
no further danger to society is contemplated from the criminal
act." 03 Moreover, it may be healthier for society if suspected crimi-
nals are charged within a certain period of time after the alleged
crime was committed or are relieved of the possibility of having to
defend themselves after a reasonable period "as punishment is not
the only means of healing the wound to society.''' 10
Many courts have relied upon these public policy reasons to sup-
port the conclusion that the statute is nonwaivable in a criminal
case. In Waters v. United States, 05 the defendant first asserted the
limitations defense on a motion to vacate his sentence under title
28, section 2255 of the United States Code.'0 ' In deciding whether
the statute should be deemed waived, the court stated:
[If recognition of a distinction between the statute of repose in
civil cases and the substantive bar in criminal cases, is to have
any meaning in the administration of criminal justice, the statute
of limitations must be held to affect not only the remedy, but to
operate as a jurisdictional limitation upon the power to prosecute
and punish.07
Thus, because Waters held that the defense is jurisdictional and
nonwaivable, the defendant's failure to plead the statute in the trial
court did not constitute a waiver. 8 Similarly, in City of Cleveland
v. Hirsch,09 because of the differences in the public policy goals of
criminal and civil statutes of limitation, the court held that
"jurisdiction cannot be conferred upon the court by any act or omis-
sion of the parties, hence, the defense of the statute cannot be
waived by failure to assert it." '
Perceiving no distinction between the policies underlying civil
and criminal statutes of limitation, other courts have held that the
defendant's failure to assert the statute constitutes a waiver.," The
103. United States v. Bonanno, 177 F. Supp. 106, 112 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. United States v. Bufalino, 285 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1960).
104. Askins v. United States, 251 F.2d 909, 912 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
105. 328 F.2d 739 (10th Cir. 1964).
106. See note 6 supra.
107. 328 F.2d at 743.
108. Id.
109. 26 Ohio App.2d 6, 268 N.E.2d 600 (1971).
110. Id. at __, 268 N.E.2d at 602.
111. United States v. Kenner, 354 F.2d 780 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 958 (1966);
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limitations defense also has been deemed waived by a plea of
guilty."' For example, the court in Wild relied on two circuit court
cases that equated guilty pleas with waiver of the statute."3 In
United States v. Parrino"I the court characterized the statute as a
defense addressed to the merits which was precluded by a guilty
plea. Similarly, in United States v. Doyle"' the court concluded that
an unqualified guilty plea bars the assertion of the statute. In Wild
the court's reliance on the two cases appears unfounded, in that
Wild's efforts to prevent indictment hardly can be equated to a
guilty plea.
The issue of whether a criminal defendant by express agreement
may validly waive the protection of the statute, however, never has
been litigated. Nonetheless, the court in Doyle did assert that, even
if the statute of limitations claim is not waived by a guilty plea, a
defendant may agree to waive the statute after consultation with
counsel."' But cases such as Doyle that allow waiver of the statute
ignore the paramount public policy reasons for enactment of stat-
utes of limitation. In contrast, the court in Benes v. United States"7
held that the defense of the statute is not waived if, by agreement
with the accused, the Government does not institute timely prose-
cution."8 Those courts adopting this non-waivability stance are con-
cerned with upholding public policy and refuse to allow private
agreements to circumvent express legislative intent. Nonetheless,
such an approach is patently arbitrary in that it does not provide
for situations in which permitting the defendant to waive the stat-
ute would not contravene public policy.
Inasmuch as constitutional rights may be waived, allowing a de-
fendant to waive a statutory right such as limitations is not unrea-
sonable. Furthermore, waivers of civil statutes of limitations do not
United States v. Taylor, 207 F.2d 437 (2d Cir. 1953); United States v. Franklin, 188 F.2d 182
(7th Cir. 1951); Pruett v. United States, 3 F.2d 353 (9th Cir. 1925); People v. Brady, 257 App.
Div. 1000, 13 N.Y.S. 789 (1939). See Biddinger v. Commissioner of Police, 245 U.S. 128 (1917);
United States v. Johnson, 76 F. Supp. 542 (M.D. Pa.), aff'd, 165 F.2d 42 (3d Cir. 1947). See
notes 48-50 supra.
112. United States v. Doyle, 348 F.2d 715 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 843 (1965);
United States v. Parrino, 203 F.2d 284 (2d Cir. 1953). Contra, United States v. Harris, 133
F. Supp. 796 (W.D. Mo. 1955).
113. 551 F.2d at 423-24.
114. 212 F.2d 919 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 840 (1954).
115. 348 F.2d 715 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 843 (1965).
116. Id. at 719.
117. 276 F.2d 99 (6th Cir. 1960).
118. Id. at 109.
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contravene the statute's purposes; because the policy reasons under-
lying both civil and criminal statutes are similar, a waiver of crimi-
nal statutes of limitations should not be presumed to circumvent
their purpose. Thus, the most reasonable approach is to allow the
statute of limitations to be waived if certain prerequisites are met:
(1) the waiver is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary; (2) it is made
for the defendant's benefit and after consultation with counsel; and
(3) the defendant's waiver does not handicap his defense or contrav-
ene any other public policy reasons motivating the enactment of the
statute. If these conditions are met, permitting a defendant to waive
the benefit of the statute is neither unjust nor unreasonable.
CONCLUSION
In Wild the court held that, by an express agreement with the
prosecution, the defendant had validly waived his statute of limita-
tions defense. The court of appeals' inability to articulate a sound
rationale for its holding in Wild, however, resulted from the diver-
sity of case law and the ultimate failure of the old jurisdictional-
affirmative defense distinction to meet the needs of modern crimi-
nal procedure. Nonetheless, despite the erroneous rationales es-
poused, the result was reasonable in that all the requisites for a valid
waiver were met: Wild's waiver was voluntarily and intelligently
made; he executed it with the assistance of counsel and for his own
benefit; and his defense was not handicapped by the waiver in that
Wild knew of his possible indictment before the statute expired.
Moreover, because Wild was indicted shortly after the statute ran,
his defense was not prejudiced. Furthermore, Wild's prosecution
was delayed by his solicitation of an extension from the prosecution,
rather than by the Government's failure to institute timely prosecu-
tion. Therefore, the court's decision to uphold Wild's waiver and
permit prosecution for a time barred offense was the correct one.
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